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Book Review
THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY
Beverley-Smith Huw, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge,
U.K.). 2002. 329 PP.
SHELDON W. HALPERN*
The right of the publicity, as a construct in American jurispru-
dence, begins with the 1953 opinion of Judge Jerome Frank in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.1  This brief opinion,
by one of the founders of the legal realist movement, recognizes that
a celebrity2 has a right to damages and other relief for the unauthor-
ized commercial appropriation of the celebrity’s persona and that
such a right is independent of a common-law or a statutory right of
privacy.3  By 1953, the courts and the legislatures of the various states
had come to recognize a “right of privacy,” in the sense of a personal,
subjective interest in anonymity.4  The task for Judge Frank in Haelan
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1. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
2. For present purposes, the right of publicity is considered peculiarly celebrity based,
arising only in the case of an individual who has attained some degree of notoriety or fame.  Al-
though commentators disagree over whether “celebrity” is a necessary element of the cause of
action or relates only to the extent of damages sustained, in practice that debate is largely aca-
demic.  See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 702 (Ga. 1982).  See also Tim Frazer, Appropriation of Personality
— A New Tort?, 99 LAW Q. REV. 281, 308 (1983).  But cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Inde-
pendence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 202–03 (1983)
(advocating recognition of a “universal” right of publicity).
3. See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of
the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1199 (1986) (analyzing the devel-
opment of a doctrinal right of publicity as a protection of distinct economic interests in person-
ality).
4. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and
the Law’s Limitations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 539, 540 (1991).
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was to separate and differentiate this new “right of publicity” from its
ties to the earlier right of privacy.5
Haelan thus was the start of a judicial and legislative movement
delineating an economic right in one’s persona distinct from the right
of privacy or any of the other cognates and analogues in tort law.
Over the course of the half-century that followed Judge Frank’s ar-
ticulation of the right, the right of publicity emerged as an independ-
ent construct.  With only the ironic counterpoint of the New York
Court of Appeals6—which held, in 1984, that New York’s right of pri-
vacy statute precluded recognition of a common-law right of public-
ity7—in the years since Haelan we have seen a process of maturation
in the development of a flexible common-law approach to the com-
mercialization of identity and the “associative value”8 inherent in ce-
lebrity.9  The process effectively culminated in the embodiment of the
right of publicity, as a separate right, recognizing the separate inter-
est, in the Restatement of Unfair Competition.10
Whatever the social merit of commercialization of personality11
and/or the morality of commercializing one’s identity,12 the economic
reality is that, for good or ill, the phenomenon of celebrity generates
value.  As the Third Circuit observed, “[a] famous individual’s name,
likeness, and endorsement carry value and an unauthorized use harms
the person both by diluting the value of the name and depriving that
individual of compensation.”13  Whether we bemoan or applaud the
fact, the marketplace creates this value; so too, whether, in the case of
5. See Halpern, supra note 3, at 1201–08.
6. In Haelen, some 30 years earlier, Judge Frank purportedly was applying New York law.
Haelen, 202 F.2d 866 at 867.
7. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984).
8. “At its heart, the value of the right of publicity is associational.”  McFarland v. Miller,
14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994).
9. See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independ-
ent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995) (discuss-
ing the state of legal recognition of the right of publicity).
10. Section 46 of the Restatement, Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person’s
Identity: The Right of Publicity, provides that: “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of
a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for [monetary and injunctive] relief.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
11. Cf. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
163 (1981) (stating “[f]ame is not inconsistent with merit but neither is it evidence of merit”).
12. See generally Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993) (arguing that centralized, private ownership and
control of celebrity images poses a threat to cultural pluralism and self determination).
13. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994).
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a given individual, the fame, and its attendant commercial value, is
abstractly justifiable or earned by effort or totally fortuitous is largely
irrelevant to the market reality.  As the Ninth Circuit noted:
Television and other media create marketable celebrity identity
value.  Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those
who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit.  The law
protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit this value whether the
celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a
combination thereof.14
Of course, the simple assertion that something has value does not
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the law must protect that value.
The emergence and maturation of the right of publicity is recognition
of a societal determination in the United States, through the courts
and the legislatures, that the individual’s interest in the associative
value of his or her persona merits legal protection.
The American experience with the rights of publicity and privacy
appears to have been notably homegrown and is quite different from
the experience in other countries, particularly our sister common-law
jurisdiction, the United Kingdom.  That very different American ex-
perience serves as a continuing ostinato in THE COMMERCIAL
APPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY, by Huw Beverley-Smith, pub-
lished in 2002 as part of the Cambridge Studies in Intellectual Property
Rights series.  The book considers the treatment of “commercial ap-
propriation of personality” in the United Kingdom and the Com-
monwealth countries.  As opposed to the United States, the United
Kingdom has not recognized either a general right to privacy pro-
tecting interests in anonymity nor an independent right of publicity
directed to the economic interest.  The author, therefore, attempts to
analyze “commercial appropriation of personality” in terms of its
dignitary and proprietary interests, with the aim of determining how
existing law in the United Kingdom deals with those interests and, in
the words of the publisher, “whether a coherent justification for a
new remedy may be identified from a range of competing theories.”
Read in the context of clearly established independent rights of
privacy and publicity in the United States and an equally clear rejec-
tion of such independent rights in the United Kingdom, the book may
seem strange to an American reader.  As the author suggests, “[t]o
American lawyers, the whole project may have a vaguely nineteenth-
century feel, as the English courts continue to debate whether to rec-
14. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ognise interests that the U.S. courts have recognised and protected in
various forms for over a century.”15
Where the central issue in the development of the right of pub-
licity in the United States lay in its linkage to the earlier right of pri-
vacy, the author locates the problem in the United Kingdom in the
standards and limitations of the existing U.K. doctrines of “unfair
competition” and “passing off,” and a legal culture inimical to the de-
velopment of independent causes of action separate from existing
constructs.  The book examines these English common-law doctrines
at great length, with the intent to determine how, if at all, the interests
that underlay the American right of publicity may be met by applica-
tion of these doctrines.  In that connection, there is rather elaborate
discussion of these common-law torts in English law and Australian
law, with particular emphasis on what appears to be the reluctance of
the English courts to expand the boundaries of the established com-
mon-law principles to embrace more generally the interests involved
in commercial appropriation of personality.  The comparative analy-
sis of the tort of “passing off” leads to an extended discussion of a
broader concept of “unfair competition and the doctrine of misap-
propriation,” with an apparently obligatory discussion of the old and,
now, quite limited, U.S. Supreme Court International News Service
opinion16 and Justice Brandeis’ dissent there.17
With acute awareness of the difficulties under the English system
of formulating a new, independent tort not linked to the pre-existing
common-law doctrines, the author attempts to find a way to analogize
what is in effect a right of publicity to the established and recognized
torts.  Ultimately Beverley-Smith finds the analogies unsatisfying,
concluding that a cognate of the American right of publicity is not a
likely extension of existing U.K. doctrine (although he finds Austra-
lian law far more hospitable to expansion of the misappropriation
doctrine); rather, if it is to stand, it must stand alone.
After examining “misappropriation” and “passing off,” and the
inadequacy of those torts to deal with the interests in commercial ap-
propriation of persona, the book (in Part III) engages in a detailed
analysis of the “dignitary interests” which the author asserts are im-
plicated in commercial appropriation of personality.  The laws of pri-
vacy and publicity in the United States are examined, as is the
15. HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY xi
(2002) [hereinafter Beverley-Smith].
16. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
17. Id. at 250.
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“piecemeal recognition of privacy interests in English law,” with dis-
cursions into Canadian and German law, as well as into defamation
and “interests in freedom from mental distress.”
It is here that the book shows its origins in a doctoral disserta-
tion, as much of the material in Part III looks and feels like a kind of
academic fill, encumbered as well with a bothersome repetitiveness.
The author clearly recognizes that the signal accomplishment in the
American development of the right of publicity was its separation
from privacy, its divorce from other analogies, and its emergence as
an independent tort founded on the economic interest in the associa-
tive value of personality.  Nevertheless, he insists on creating what I
believe are unnecessary complications by continuing to link the eco-
nomic and “dignitary” interests,18 recreating the kind of linkage that
was so detrimental to the rational development of the right of public-
ity in the United States.  With little explanation, other than the basic
premise that the law of the United Kingdom is not hospitable to a
general right of privacy directed to the dignitary interests, he per-
ceives “commercial appropriation” as “a hybrid problem,” whose so-
lution “requires a remedy which encompasses both economic and
dignitary aspects.”19
Parts IV (“Pervasive problems”) and V (“Conclusions”) purport
to examine this “hybrid” problem and related theoretical constructs
in order to find an appropriate remedy.  The author concludes that, at
least in the United Kingdom, a satisfactory result that recognizes “the
autonomy of appropriation of personality” cannot be reached by ex-
tending the boundaries of the existing common-law pigeonholes.
However, he offers only the most tentative suggestions as to how the
problem he postulates can or should be resolved and therefore leaves
us with a grand anti-climax.
For the American reader, the value of the book lies more in its
periphery than at its core.  The discussion of the difficulties in fash-
ioning new common-law remedies in the United Kingdom as com-
pared to the more relaxed approach in Australia is interesting and in-
formative, as is the author’s suggestion of some (undefined role) in
the United Kingdom for the “European Convention on the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” and the U.K.’s
“Human Rights Act of 1998.”
18. BEVERLEY-SMITH, supra note 15, at 319 (stating that “the two principal perspectives
on the problem of appropriation of personality: the unfair competition perspective and the dig-
nitary torts perspective”).
19. Id. at 322.
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So too, the discussion of the societal differences separating the
English and American systems20—although a compilation of other
sources, rather than original with the author21—is particularly worth-
while.  In discussing why there are such profound differences between
the English and American approach to the rights of privacy and pub-
licity, Beverley-Smith discusses “sociological factors,” “precedent and
legal theory,” “political and institutional factors,” and “academic in-
fluences and differences in legal culture.”  In the process, he gives us
insight into “how two superficially similar jurisdictions could have re-
sponded so differently to the same basic problem.”
For the English reader, the book offers significant insights into
the American approach and a model of interest-based rather than
categorical law.  Beverley-Smith’s strong call for examination of the
interests underlying a legal right is most welcome.  I would have been
happier if the discussion of American law were somewhat more me-
ticulous and broader in its sources.  The author has a tendency to
weigh lower state court and federal District Court opinions as heavily
as those of the federal Courts of Appeals and the highest state courts.
Similarly, notwithstanding the great attention he pays to the subject,
Beverley-Smith relies on a very few American academic and other
writers, largely ignoring the significant body of more recent material
concerned with the parameters and limitations of the right of public-
ity (rather than with its existence).  More significantly, while recog-
nizing that the right of publicity is a mature tort, whose foundation is
now almost uniformly accepted in American law, he nevertheless
gives disproportionate weight to the limited calls for re-examination
of the tort, giving the erroneous impression that the issue is in consid-
erable flux.  The matter of the treatment of American sources and ju-
dicial opinions, which unfortunately colors the otherwise excellent
treatment of the development of the rights of privacy and publicity in
the United States, has the unintended consequence of making me, as
one familiar with American law but not nearly so familiar with the
law of the United Kingdom, similarly ask if the author’s treatment of
the U.K. approach to these issues is indeed as full and evenhandedly
complete as it appears to be.
One would also have wished for greater clarity of structure; in its
desire for completeness, the book at times seems to wander and, in
consequence, be needlessly repetitive.  Again, this is probably due to
20. Id. at 189–99.
21. The discussion is taken from P. S. ATIYAH & R. S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987) and J. G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS (1988).
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its origin in a dissertation, and the constraints imposed by that model
of writing.  When this chaff is removed, however, what remains is a
most useful, albeit shorter, work.  While it is a work that does not
meet its promise of identifying “a coherent justification for a new
remedy,” or demonstrate why its concern is with a “hybrid” problem,
it does thoughtfully and informatively raise the significant issues that
will have to be addressed if the right that has been clearly accepted in
the United States, and that is moving to acceptance in the Common-
wealth countries, is to become part of the jurisprudence in the United
Kingdom.
In the United States, the attempt to analogize the right of pub-
licity to privacy interests, or to pigeon-hole it in a “property” or “un-
fair competition” jacket were obstacles that had to be overcome.  In
the United Kingdom the analogic inflation problem revolves around
the existing torts of “passing off” and “misappropriation.”  Analogies
are useful, but they can also be deceptively dangerous.
The strength of an analogical approach is that once the equivalence
is established, previously developed rationales and conclusions can
be brought to bear on the new situation . . . .  But a major difficulty
with analogies, derived from precisely the same source as their
strength, is that they tend to impose a mature, elaborated system on
what may well be an unformulated situation.  The choice of the
analogy may not be fully justifiable, and the analogy’s application
to the situation may carry with it a misleading certainty.  [N]one of
the analogies of privacy, defamation, or property law seems correct
to apply to the publicity issue.22
In urging an interest-based analysis to “appropriation,” Beverley-
Smith recognizes the dangers of analogy in creating new rights and
remedies.  The ultimate value in this book is to be found in its call for
finding ways to abandon the search for analogies and construct a
meaningful legal right addressed to a recognized societal interest.  If
the book does not provide answers, it nevertheless asks the important
questions and in so doing creates a necessary framework for action.
A brief coda on solemnity seems appropriate.  A few of the con-
temporary American commentators approach the right of publicity
with a frightening degree of portentousness, seeing recognition of this
right as an assault on the public domain, if not on civilization as we
know it.  As I have suggested elsewhere,23 recognition of the legal
right is predicated on a societal reaction to the phenomenon of celeb-
22. Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life
After Death?, 89 YALE L. J. 1125, 1127–28 (1980).
23. Halpern, supra note 9, at 871–72.
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rity and the economic value associated with fame.  The question of
who should benefit from that value does not amount to choosing be-
tween the “public domain” in general and a perhaps undeserving ce-
lebrity fortuitously pocketing public largesse.  Except at its margins,
the limitations inherent in the right of publicity (such as the “com-
mercial” nature of the activities to which it relates and the extensive
reach of the “newsworthiness” defense) serve effectively to protect
the public interest.  The public interest involved in the commercializa-
tion of fame really lies in avoiding unfairness within the universe of
the competing commercial interests.
To an unfortunate extent, a similar solemnity, particularly evi-
dent in the author’s somewhat cavalier discussion and dismissal of the
various theoretical justifications for the right of publicity, pervades
this book.  It is difficult to resist the urge to say to him, as well as to
our own apocalyptic commentators: “Lighten up, it’s only about
money!”  As opposed to the difficult compromises between society’s
interest in free expression and the individual’s interest in decency and
dignity, implicated by the law of defamation and the right of pri-
vacy—and the related compromises inherent in the law of copy-
right—the right of publicity has only the most tangential relationship
to the fundamental nature of our society.  Indeed, we enjoy the allure
of fame and the foibles of celebrities; at bottom, the value we give to
celebrity is funny and the subject begs not to be taken too seriously.
It would have been nice to find some of that humor in this book’s
search for a rationale for a U.K. version of the right of publicity.
